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Why Democracies Still Have Corruption:
AQuantitative Analysis Integrating Three
Theoretical Frameworks
Richard 1. Vigil

orruption corrodes democracy, decaying institutions
in every country regardless of regime type. When
politicians misuse public office for private gain, the
government loses legitimacy and accountability.' Corrupt public officials lead to inefficient and ineffective
government, causing citizens to distrust elected officials.
Democratic leaders come to power through elections, but
corruption sabotages electoral campaigns with illegal
money. Corruption undermines and erodes two central
nonns of democracy: equality and openness." Certain
individuals benefit at the expense of society, and "The
rights and protections citizens should be able to enjoy
become favors, to be repaid in kind."3 Most scholars now
accept that corruption poses a problem for many governments, and early studies have shown that corruption can
injure a state's opportunity for economic growth. 4 High
levels of corruption discourage foreign investment in a
country, reducing economic development. s Widespread
corruption also ties up funds that could otherwise be
available for economic growth. In addition, corruption
preserves and can even increase inequalities in the distribution of income."
States are now searching for answers to corruption.
In fact, "[m]otivated by a desire to help refonners curb
corruption, social scientists have tried for the last thirty
years to understand its causes and provide guides for its
control. "7 By examining the causes ofcorruption in today 's
governments, policymakers will be prepared to combat
and correct the problems that stem from corruption.
Revealing the causes for corruption will help countries
eliminate and prevent its effects. Understanding why
corruption occurs and why it occurs in some countries
more often than others will serve as the first step towards
legitimizing democracy.

C

Using a cross-national analysis, I identify the causes
of corruption in today's societies. Previous attempts at explaining corruption cross-nationally have only tested a few
theories and relied on a limited dataset, usually examining
corruption through one theoretical framework and testing their theories on fewer than one hundred countries. In
this study, I examine 142 countries to incrcase explanatory
power and make my findings more generalized. I also tested
how each comparative theoretical framework~rational
choice, cultural, and structural~affected corruption. Testing each approach allowed me to detennine which factors
matter the most in explaining and preventing corruption.
I will demonstrate that countries with a free press,
greater economic development, and high levels of Protestantism experience lower levels of corruption. In order
to demonstrate this, I first show that the level of democracy cannot by itself explain the variation in the levels
of corruption countries experience. Next, I examine different theories to look for potential explanations for corruption. Then, I operationalize the various variables and
test their strength in an OLS regression. Finally, I state
my findings and conclusions along with any implications
that the data provides.

AFailure of Democracy
Democracies claim to have many benefits in both
the political and economical realms. Many scholars have
argued that democracy prevents and mitigates the effects
and incidences of corruption. R In a study of the challenges
that corruption causes for democratic governance and
market economics, Wayne Sandholtz and William Koetzle
find that "those countries seen as least corrupt are those
nations that are known to be democratic" and "the countries
viewed as most corrupt are those traditionally seen as
13
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authoritarian."9 Furthennore, Mark Warren,lo studying
what corruption means in a democracy, concludes his
paper claiming that becoming more democratic will likely
cure the negative effects of corruption.
At first glance, corruption appears to correlate to the
regime type or the level of democracy. Using Freedom
House's Political Rights score as a measure of democracy
and Transparency International's Corruption Perception
Index (CPI), Figure 1 illustrates the negative relationship
between the level of democracy and the perception of
corruption. As the level of democracy improves, the perceived level of corruption diminishes and the less democratic states, or autocracies (score below four on democracy), suffer from more corruption. In fact, thirty-five out
of the thirty-eight autocratic countries scored below four
on the CPI, and Chad had the lowest score at I. 7. Only
Oman (6.3), Qatar (5.9), and Tunisia (4.9) scored above
a four. Conversely, the more democratic states enjoy less
corruption. Iceland has the highest score at 9.7 with the
other Scandinavian countries not far behind.
Figure 1: Democracy versus Corruption
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Political Rights

Three democratic principles can affect corruption:
participation, competition, and accountability. II A democratic regime allows everyone in society to participate in
the governing process by allowing all to pursue political
power and vote. Similarly, democracy promotes competition between candidates in legitimate elections that are
free, fair, and regular. Also, democracy promotes transparency and legitimacy to ensure that the public can hold officials accountable; ensuring, "Political rulers and elected
representatives serve as 'agents' of their constituencies
and must justify their actions and decisions in order to remain in office."12
14

Underneath these three broad principles, two key dimensions--elections and rights--explain how democratic
principles reduce and prevent corruption. 13 Elections increase accountability and allow voters to punish corrupt
officials. 14 As already mentioned, democracy ensures that
adult citizens have the right to vote and that politicians will
genuinely compete for office. Politicians must win by the
mandate of the popular vote. In principal, elected officials
derive their power from the public and are accountable to
their needs. 15 Elected officials cultivate trust from their constituents and other politicians by fulfilling campaign promises through honest and effective means; they avoid corruption to please the voters. Likewise, competitors for office
have an incentive to discover and publicize an incumbent's
corrupt behavior.16 Democratic elections also provide citizens the power to remove corrupt politicians more easily.17
Corrupt activities can impose large costs on society, and
the wallets of constituents. IX These costs will annoy voters,
and after repeated negative exposure, the public will punish
public officials. Once identified as corrupt, officials may be
removed from office, lose the next election, and face prosecution. The participatory processes of democracy encourage integrity in politicians and increase the costs of corruption. In contrast, authoritarian regimes have free reign unless restrained by democratic institutions, and authoritative
rulers face few checks on their power.
Finally, citizens in a democracy enjoy more rights that
are better protected. Democracies establish institutions such
as the judiciary and a police force to ensure the protection of
individual property rights. These institutions limit the ways
a public official may engage in corruption by increasing
transparency, and the likelihood of punishment. Effective
institutions protect the personal rights of individuals against
abuses from the state. Furthennore, democracy grants society basic freedoms: assembly, speech, press, etc. These
rights "allow people and groups to uncover infonnation, ask
questions, demand inquires, and publicize their discoveries."19 Media may freely investigate, witnesses may openly
testifY, and comlpt politicians will theoretically be caught.
But despite these prescribed remedies, corruption still
occurs in many democracies. Figure 1 reveals that comlption does not disappear and barely decreases as democracy
increases. In fact, Figure 1 shows a substantial range in the
frequency of perceived corruption, even among the most
democratic nations (score of seven for democracy). Arguably, these countries represent the strongest democracies
in the world and should enjoy the most from its benefits.
However, the levels of comlption range from 9.7 in Iceland to 3.4 in Poland, which has more corruption than some
authoritarian nations. Indeed, more than a third (34.15 percent) of the most democratic nations are below the median
level of perceived corruption. Authoritarian countries may
suffer the most from corruption, but high levels of corruption still exist in democratic regimes.
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A bivariate regression reveals the weakness of this
perceived relationship. I checked for statistical and substantive significance using a test of correlation; the results
are displayed in Table 1. My results are highly statistically
significant, with a p-value of .000. However, the r-squared
reveals that the level of democracy in a state only explains
32.83 percent of its level of perceived corruption.
Table 1: Correlations between Democracy and Corruption

Corruption Pearson Correlation
Perception Sig. (2-tailed)
Index
N
Political
Rights

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

CORRlWITON
PERCEPTION
INDEX

POLmCAL
RIGHTS

142

.573(**)
.000
142

.573(**)
.000
142

142

** Correlation is significant at the 0.0 I level (2-tailcd).

What causes high levels of corruption to occur in
democratic regimes? How did some of the most democratic
countries almost eliminate corruption while others suffer
with high levels? I will attempt to answer these questions
in the following sections.

Explaining Corruption
Following the suggestion of Lichbach and Zuckerman, I will use three theoretical approaches to explain cornlption: rational choice, cultural, and structural."il Rational
choice theories look at the costs and benefits for an individual to use comlption based on the incentives within a
society. Cultural theories focus on the societal values and
norms that guide human behavior. And structural theories
examine how societal factors understood in a specific historical context combine to create or restrict opportunities
for corrupt behavior.

Rational Choice
Rational choice theories use an individual level of
analysis to focus on the behavior and actions of human
beings themselves. They assume that individuals make
rational decisions and seek to maximize self-interest."l
Individuals have preferences, and a rational agent always
chooses the preferred outcome over a less preferential
outcome. The rational choice framework claims that
when the gains from comlpt behavior outweigh the costs,
politicians will use corruption. On the other hand, when
the risk of exposure and possible punishments exceed the
anticipated benefits, public officials will not engage in
corrupt behavior.
The principal-agent theory represents one of the
leading theories used by rational choice theorists to explain corruption. Citizens, the principal, empower politicians. the agents, to achieve certain tasks for the public
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benefit. 22 However, in this delegation of power, agents
may abuse the relationship because of two problems:
hidden information and hidden action. 23 Citizens do not
have all of the information available to politicians, and
they cannot feasibly scrutinize the behavior of every
public official. Under these circumstances, agents have
the incentive and opportunity to engage in corrupt behavior and maximize their private gain. To remedy this
adverse relationship, society needs to make politicians
accountable to citizens and make politicians' actions
more transparent. 24 Monitoring provides one way to increase accountability and transparency.
Media plays a significant role in monitoring
politicians. 25 Newspapers, television news programs, and
radio news programs provide the public with a continuous
stream of information. Reporters and journalists search for
stories they think their audiences want to hear. Political
scandals and acts of corruption rank among their favorite
topics to report. A free and autonomous press may obtain
the resources necessary to inform the public about comlpt
behavior. On the other hand, if corrupt government
officials censor media, journalists are unable to publish
stories about comlpt behavior. Politicians in these
societies will engage in more corruption because their risk
of punishment is low. Thus, a country with a free press
should have lower levels of corruption.
Additionally, the population size may affect the incentives for corruption. 26 Countries with a large population
suffer from problems of coordination and collective action. So it is difficult for larger societies to monitor corrupt
officials. A bigger popUlation will usually require more
representatives, and, consequently, it will prove harder to
monitor an increased number of politicians. On the other
hand, smaller states, like Singapore, are easier to monitor.
Smaller populations usually have more etncient communication flow, and police have an easier time discovering
government fraud. Thus, a country with a smaller population should have lower levels of corruption.
Rational choice theory also considers economic
factors in determining the costs and benefits of corruption.
Scholars such as Max Weber argue that "economic
development was a necessary condition for the emergence
of rationally organized, legally driven bureaucracies
that exhibit little corruption."27 They believe that greater
economic development increases the rule of law and acts
as a control on corruption. With a strong nile of law, the
judicial and police systems may more effectively protect
and uphold property rights. When niles consistently govern
these rights, politicians have less incentive to engage in
corrupt acts.
Rational choice theory assumes that politicians, and
the public alike, desire more money. In poverty-stricken
areas, people may want to extend or receive a bribe. With
more material goods at stake, impoverished people have
15
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stronger incentives to engage in corrupt behavior. To
exacerbate the problem, under-funded agencies set up for
monitoring, such as police, will have a harder time ensuring
transparency and enforcing the law. Thus, a country with
more wealth should have lower levels of corruption.
On the other hand, the argument that wealth decreases corruption is an endogenous problem because
corruption may also decrease wealth. The violation of
property rights may prevent citizens from leaving impoverished conditions. Previous studies have already proven
the ill effects that corruption causes for the economy.28
Nevertheless, most scholars include a variable measuring
the effect of wealth when they try to explain corruption
cross-nationally. Such measurements may represent a theoretical oversight in explaining corruption, and further research may help explain the complex relationship between
the economy and corruption. However, in keeping with
previous scholars' works, I will measure the influence that
wealth has on corruption while keeping in mind that corruption may also affect wealth.
Finally, rationalists study the type of government.
Different democratic systems create different levels of
competition. A federal structure creates more competition
because of sub- jurisdictions. 29 Such decentralization of
federal states leads to more corruption because politicians
only have to influence small segments of the government,
and smaller actions are less visible. Fewer agencies exist
to oversee and enforce honesty. Similarly, public officials
may create stronger relationships with individuals in local
government arenas. Thus, a country with a non-federalist
structure should have lower levels of corruption.
In sum, under the rational choice theory, I will test
four hypotheses. First, countries with a free press will experience less corruption. Second, countries with smaller
populations will experience less corruption. Third, wealthier countries will experience less corruption. And fourth,
non-federal states will experience less corruption.

Culture
Cultural theorists argue that culture "shapes the behavior and actions of people, both at the individual and
collective levels."3o They understand culture "as an inherently fluid system of meaning, with multiple 'voices'
and a complex influence on social, political, or economic
processes."31 Cultural theories claim that countries have
high levels of corruption because their norms and values
permit it.
In general, cultural theorists blame a "culture of mistrust" for high levels of perceived corruption. 32 Where corruption has become commonplace, citizens begin to lose
trust in government officials. In a culture of mistrust, public officials may justify their corrupt actions by claiming
that everyone else is also corrupt. Corruption becomes "a
cultural legacy, building up over time and affecting the
16

politics of an entire region for generations."33 Religion
may affect the amount of corruption in a state. More hierarchical religions, such as Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy,
and Islam, provide fewer challenges and checks on the behavior of public officials. 34 Traditionally, these faiths teach
believers obedience to authority and blind faith. Politicians
develop an almost divine nature, and citizens will be less
likely to challenge their actions. On the other hand, Protestant faiths are more individualistic and provide fewer opportunities to engage in corrupt behavior. Thus, Protestant
countries should have less corruption.
Democratic norms may also explain the level of corruption. Democracy creates norms and values of equality
and participation that condemn corrupt behavior. These
values become engrained in society through a process of
socialization. Over time, this process strengthens as values diffuse and spread to broader parts of society. Some
scholars argue that a culture of democratic norms is a necessary step in eliminating corruption: "The public will not
care about detecting, publicizing, and punishing corrupt
acts unless broadly shared norms treat corruption as antagonistic to basic democratic values."35 A long history of
democracy should show deeply rooted norms and lower
levels of corruption.
In short, under the cultural theory, I will test two
hypotheses. First, predominantly Protestant countries will
experience less corruption. And second, countries with
deeper democratic roots will experience less corruption.

Structural
Many of the rational choice and cultural explanations
for corruption could overlap to create a system ripe for
corruption. A structural approach focuses less on the
individual causes and more on historically specific factors.
Structuralists believe that "human action and behavior are
fundamentally shaped by the larger environment, which,
in tum, is the product of dominant economic, political, and
social arrangements."36 These factors combine to create a
configuration that affects the level of corruption. 3 ?
Since I use a more generalized approach to explain
corruption, it is difficult to examine the unique institutional and structural factors of each country. Because the
structural approach relies more on modes and configurations, these variables will not be as reliable or valid in an
ordinary regression. Nevertheless, I will test one historically specific cause of corruption-colonialism. Recent
scholars argue that the varying colonial experiences created different "socioeconomic and cultural institutions
[in] postcolonial societies."3x More specifically, the economic, political, and sociocultural institutions that Britain set up in its colonies have caused the future countries
to develop differently than other colonies. Great Britain
primarily used a liberal model to establish colonies that
would maximize profit through exchange in free markets.

RICHARD

This method promoted a common law system that upheld
private property rights, encouraged commercial production, and enforced the rule of law. Common law systems
help to reduce corruption by introducing powerful norms
that stress compliance with established procedures
and offer greater protection and recourse to individuals harmed by corruption. Contrastingly, other colonial
powers used more mercantilist methods that privileged
"status groups and explicitly imposer d] hierarchical relations of dependence." 39
In addition, the level of colonial involvement also
changed the historical outcomes of former British
colonies. 40 Great Britain colonized less complex areas
because they were easier to restructure. On the other
hand, other colonial powers left complex areas largely
unchanged because the existing institutions were so hard
to modify. Consequently, the postcolonial development
of former British colonies also depends on the level of
colonization, with heavier involvement leading towards
more development. Thus, under the structural theory I will
test one hypothesis: countries where Britain left strong
colonial legacies will experience less corruption.

Research Design
To test the explanatory power of these theories for
corruption, I operationalized the various variables and ran
a linear regression. The 142 countries I studied included
both democratic and authoritarian regimes, as well as high
variance in economic development. I compiled my data
for the year 2005.

Dependent Variable
I define corruption as the misuse of public office for
private gain. Scholars frequently use this definition, and it
is generally accepted in most mediums."l To operationalize
corruption, I used the 2005 CPI created by Transparency
Intemational. These scores range from 10 (least corrupt) to
o (most corrupt). Transparency International constructs its
index from nine to ten sources they had compiled during the
previous three years. They use three types of sources: country
experts, business leaders from developing countries, and
resident business leadersY By using a standardized measure
of comlption, I will more properly compare corruption
cross-nationally. Because Transparency International only
measures the perception of comlption, cultural differences
may skew the measure and make it difficult to test the true
influence of cultural values.

Independent Variables
I used several sources to compile data for my
independent variables. First, I created a control variable for
the level of democracy. I used Freedom House's Political
Rights score to operationalize democracy. Theoretically,
adding the Civil Liberties score to the Political Rights
one would create a more complete measure of democracy.

I.
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However, Freedom House includes some of the other
variables I am testing in their measure of civil liberties.
Thus, I left the Civil Liberties measure out of my control
variable for democracy to avoid multicollinearity.
To measure political rights, Freedom House uses a
survey to determine the degree to which countries allow
people to participate freely in the political processY The
survey asks questions about three general areas-the electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, and
the functioning of government-as well as an additional
discretionary area. From the answers, Freedom House
compiles a measure that ranges from one (best) to seven
(worst). For the purposes of this study, I inverted the variable so that a seven represents more political rights, and a
one represents less.
To measure the effect of media on corruption, I used a
separate Freedom House survey that measures the freedom
of the press. It asks questions about the atfect on the media
in three general areas: the legal environment, the political
environment, and the economic environment. 44 This measure ranks press freedom from zero (best) to one hundred
(worst) and provides a value of the free flow of news and
information. Once again, for the purposes of this study, I
inverted this score so that one hundred represents the freest
press and zero represents the least.
I found two variables measuring the etfect of population size and wealth using the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. For population size, I entered
in the population value. To measure the impact of economic forces, I will use the measure for Gross Domestic Product (GOP) per capita measured in terms of Power
Purchasing Parity (PPP).
I used the 2006 CIA World Factbook to construct two
variables measuring the affect of federalism and Protestantism on corruption. I made federalism a dummy variable. Using the government type coding found in the
World Factbook, all those labeled as Federal and Federal
Republic received a one, and the remaining countries received a zero. For Protestantism, I recorded the percentage
of the population that is Protestant.
Using the Polity IV Project data, I constructed
a variable measuring the socialization of democratic
values. The polity research tradition codes "the authority
characteristics of states in the world system for purposes
of comparative, quantitative analysis."45 I used a sum of
Polity IV's polity two measure for every year that a country
scored a zero or more. The polity two score combines
the democracy and autocracy measures to provide a
quantitative measure for the strength of democracy. It uses
a scale ranging from negative ten (strongly autocratic) to
positive ten (strongly democratic). Because I only want
to test the positive effects that democratic values have on
corruption and not the negative effects that an authoritarian
regime might cause, I only added up the positive numbers
17
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in the polity two column and assigned a zero to countries
without any democratic experience.
To test for the effect of British colonial mle, I used a
measure constmcted by Matthew Lange, James Mahoney,
and Matthias vom Hau. 46 They created a five-point scale
measuring the different levels of colonialism in the former
British colonies. I assigned each label a corresponding
number ranging from zero (Low) to five (High).

Table 3: Factor Analysis
Variable

Factor
Loading

Press Freedom

.782

(ollinearity

Population

.036

Some of the variables I am using measure different
phenomena that may be correlated. Therefore, I ran a factor
analysis on all of the variables to test for multicollinearity;
Table 2 shows the results.

GDP (PPP) per capita

.813

Table 2: Factor Analysis
Variable

Factor
Loading

Political Rights

.814

Press Freedom

.876

Population

-.001

GDP (PPP) per capita

.800

Federal State

.302

Democratic Socialization

.872

Percent Protestant

.542

British Colonial Rule

.450

The results show that four variables-Political Rights,
Press Freedom, GDP (PPP) per capita, and Democratic
Socialization-loaded very heavily around 80 percent. Despite the statistical results, no one theory can justifY combining all four variables. Theoretically, I can only combine
the Political Rights and Democratic Socialization measures.
A transitioning democracy must begin to learn and teach
its citizens democratic norms and values, such as participation and accountability. Over time, these values spread
and increase in strength through a process of socialization.
As the democratic norms get stronger, democracy should
have more support and provide a more effective government. Thus, the political rights should also increase with
the socialization of democracy. Both factors seem to work
together to explain the strength of democracy in a given
country. Further, both variables measure similar aspects
of democracy. Democratic Socialization measures the
strength of the democratic norms and values in society,
and Political Rights measures the freedom to participate
in the political arena. However, the Democratic Socialization variable also measures the effectiveness of elections
and other procedural parts of democracy. Consequently, I
will constmct a single index, the Democratic Consolidation Index, out of these two variables. To constmct this
index, I scaled the two variables the same and calculated
their mean.
A second factor analysis (Table 3) reveals that the new
index variable corrected some of the correlation, but the
two remaining variables still loaded heavily in the analysis.
18

Yet, I cannot theoretically combine Press Freedom or GDP
(PPP) per capita to any other variable. Thus, I will leave
all the variables as they are and keep the one Democratic
Consolidation Index.

Federal State

.360

Democratic Consolidation Index

.907

Percent Protestant

.593

British Colonial Rule

.525

Results
After operationalizing all the variables and correcting for multicollinearity, I set up my data to run an OLS
regression. In the regression, I checked for statistical and
substantive significance. I considered variables with a
p-value lower than .05 as statistically significant. Then
I looked for substantive significance by multiplying the
standard deviations of each variable by its coetIicient.
Table 4 shows the results of the regression.
Only three variables showed statistical significance:
Press Freedom, GDP (PPP) per capita, and Percent
Protestant. Press Freedom has a p-value of .019; GDP
(PPP) per capita has a .000 p-value; and the Percent
Protestant variable has a p-value of .023. All the other
variables showed no statistical significance.

Table 4: Regression
Variables

2005

Press Freedom

0.01 *
(.004)

Population

-2.849E-IO
(.00)

GDP (PPP) per capita

.00***
(00)

Federal State

-.253
(.26)

Democratic Consolidation Index

.001
(.001)

Percent Protestant
British Colonial Rule

.009*
(004)
.076
(07)

R
R2
N

.912
.832
142

*p<.IO; **p<.OI; ***p<.OOI.
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard
errors in parentheses

RiCHARD

To assess the substantive significance of each variable,
I multiplied the coefficient of each factor by its standard
deviation. Table 5 reveals the results. The same three
statistically significant variables also have the highest
substantive significance.

Once again, press freedom proved statistically significant, but the level of democratic consolidation also became
statistically significant. 80th variables have p-values of
.000. Also, the Percent Protestant variable lost its statistical
significance with a p-value of .318.

Table 5: Substantive Significance

Table 6: Regression without GOP (PPP) per capita

Variables

Substantive
Significance

Press Freedom

.24

Population

-.04

GDP (PPP) per capita

1.63

Federal State

-.08

Democratic Consolidation Index

.18

Percent Protestant

.20

British Colonial Rule

.10

Variables
Press Freedom

VIGIL

2005
.028***
(-.006)

Population

-7.754E-IO
(.00)

Federal State

-0.263
(.403)

Democratic Consolidation Index

0.006***
(.001)

Percent Protestant

The Press Freedom variable shows a substantive
significance of .24. This means that for each standard
deviation in press freedom (24.33), the CPI increases by
.24. Transparency International uses a ten-point scale to
measure corruption and press freedom is measured on a
one hundred-point scale. Therefore, the media needs to
increase its freedom by almost a quarter to cause only a
2.4 percent decrease in corruption. Although this variable
proves statistically significant and has the second highest
substantive significance, a freer press does not dramatically
reduce the level of corruption.
The Percent Protestant variable shows a substantive
significance of .20. This means that for each standard
deviation in the percentage of the population that is
Protestant (22.42) the CPI increases by .20. This means
that 22.42 percent of the people of any given nation need
to convert to Protestantism in order to reduce corruption
by only 2 percent. Once again, the variable does not cause
a considerable change in the level of corruption.
GOP (PPP) per capita shows the greatest substantive
significance at 1.62. This means that for each standard
deviation of the variable (10,878) the CPI increases
by 1.62. Thus, an $11,000 increase in per capita wealth
reduces corruption by 16.2 percent. By far, GOP (PPP)
per capita causes the greatest change in the perception
of corruption. Therefore, I can conclude that wealth or
poverty contributes to the explanation of corruption the
most. As citizens begin to earn higher incomes, they
have less incentive to accept bribes, and, consequently,
politicians have less incentive to offer money for political
support. However, as previously mentioned, this finding
is problematic because corruption could be the cause
of poverty in many countries. Corruption may prevent
citizens from earning a better paycheck because all the
power and funds are concentrated among the elite. To
address endogeneity, I ran the regression again without
controlling for wealth. Table 6 shows the results.

I.

0.006
(006)

British Colonial Rule

-0.044
(.108)

R

.771

R2

.594

N

142

*p<.IO; **p<.OI; ***p<.OOI.
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard
errors in parentheses

To determine substantive significance, I again multiplied the coefficient by the standard deviation of each variable. Table 7 shows the results.
Table 7: Substantive Significance without GOP (PPP) per capita
Variables

Substantive
Significance

Press Freedom

.68

Population

-.11

Federal State

-.09

Democratic Consolidation Index

1.05

Percent Protestant

.13

British Colonial Rule

-.06

Both of the statistically significant variables also
showed the highest substantive significance. Press Freedom increased from .24 to .68. Without controlling for
wealth, a 25 percent increase in the media's freedom reduces corruption by 6.8 percent. This number still does
not reach the dramatic influence that wealth had on the
level of corruption, but excluding wealth makes the media's freedom cause almost a one step increase in the CPr.
Therefore, I can conclude that the level of press freedom
does partially explain corruption.
In addition, the level of democratic consolidation
dramatically increased its influence on corruption and
caused a substantive reduction in the CPI. The Democratic Consolidation Index shows a substantive signifi19
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cance of 1.05, so a one standard deviation increase in
the consolidation of democracy reduces cormption by
11 percent. Thus, as democratic values and norms become more engrained in society, the level of democracy
increases and corruption decreases.

Conclusion
Cormption represents a problem that every government must face. Although cormption affects every country,
some have managed to mitigate its effects. I have shown
that wealth, press freedom, and Protestantism correlate
with reduced cormption in governments. A democratic
culture may also reduce the occurrences of cormption.
On a broader theoretical level, these three factors
represent both the rational choice and cultural arguments.
Thus, it appears that determining the costs and benefits of
cormpt acts provides important insight about whether or
not a country will experience cormption. Likewise, certain
cultures seem more adept at controlling corruption than
others. These cultures promote honesty and pragmatism
and label cormption as a threat to democratic governance.
Although this study did not find any significant stmctural
argument, more work should be done to determine how
historical factors besides colonialism affect cormption.
This paper's generalized focus largely excluded many
possible stmctural factors.
In addition, my findings confirm and correct previous literature about corruption. In 2000, Sandholtz and
Koetzle concluded that wealth, strong democratic institutions, and the length of democracy affect corruption. I
have shown that wealth does indeed affect cormption,
but my results also correct their initial findings. A democracy can have strong institutions that promote political
rights but may still suffer from cormption. The level of
accepted democratic norms and values is more important at explaining cormption. In another cross-national
study, Daniel Treisman found that countries with Protestant traditions, histories of British mle, more developed
economies, and a non-federal stmcture experience less
corruption. 47 My results confirm Treisman's arguments
for Protestantism and economic development, but they
conflict with his conclusions that British colonialism and
federalism affect the level of corruption. Both of these
variables were neither statistically nor substantively significant in my study. And more recently, Xiaohui Xin and
Thomas Rudel identify poverty, large populations, and different political cultures as causes of cormption. 48 Once
again, my study confirms the idea that culture and wealth
affect the levels of corruption; however, I found that
large populations did not cause a significant change in
corruption. Despite these confirmations and corrections,
more work needs to be done to determine how economic
wealth and cormption relate to each other and affect the
other variables.
20

Although press freedom, wealth, and religion are important factors, they mean little for honest policymakers
looking for quick fixes. Fighting cormption first requires
long-term efforts to increase the wealth of a nation. Economic development is a problem for many of the same
countries that are trying to eliminate high levels of corruption. Likewise, changing the religious beliefs of most
of a society is very difficult, especially in authoritarian regimes that deny freedom of religion. Thus, policymakers
must focus on different incentives for engaging in cormpt
acts. They need to grant the press freedom to monitor and
report on the actions of various government leaders. Also,
they should create protections for reporting the truth and
make necessary information public. Promoting the rule of
law by increasing the autonomy of the judiciary and the
efficiency of the police force will also help ensure the media's freedom. Making these reforms will begin the process necessary for other changes to occur that will help
control corruption.
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